Why rapidly expanding the number of college-trained workers may not lower income inequality: the curious case of Taiwan, 1978-2011 by Keng, Shao-Hsun et al.
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) Economics
12-21-2014
Why rapidly expanding the number of college-
trained workers may not lower income inequality:
the curious case of Taiwan, 1978-2011
Shao-Hsun Keng
National University of Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Chun-Hung A. Lin
Tamkang University, Taiwan
Peter Orazem
Iowa State University, pfo@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keng, Shao-Hsun; Lin, Chun-Hung A.; and Orazem, Peter, "Why rapidly expanding the number of college-trained workers may not
lower income inequality: the curious case of Taiwan, 1978-2011" (2014). Economics Working Papers (2002–2016). 33.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/33
Why rapidly expanding the number of college-trained workers may not
lower income inequality: the curious case of Taiwan, 1978-2011
Abstract
Since 1990, Taiwan increased the college share of its labor force from 7% to 28% by converting junior colleges
to 4-year colleges. Such a rapid surge in skill supply should suppress college wages and lower income
inequality. Instead, inequality rose steadily. The surge of weaker college graduates made them weak substitutes
for better trained college graduates, increasing wage inequality within skill groups. The college premium
would have been 15% higher had college quality remained unchanged at its 1992 level. The Taiwan case shows
that increasing college access alone will not lower income inequality unless college quality is maintained.
Keywords
education, returns to skills, wage inequality, college supply, college quality, Taiwan
Disciplines
Economics
This working paper is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
IOWA	  STATE	  UNIVERSITY	  
Department	  of	  Economics	  
Ames,	  Iowa,	  50011-­‐1070	  
 
Iowa	  State	  University	  does	  not	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  color,	  age,	  religion,	  national	  origin,	  sexual	  orientation,	  
gender	  identity,	  genetic	  information,	  sex,	  marital	  status,	  disability,	  or	  status	  as	  a	  U.S.	  veteran.	  Inquiries	  can	  be	  directed	  
to	  the	  Director	  of	  Equal	  Opportunity	  and	  Compliance,	  3280	  Beardshear	  Hall,	  (515)	  294-­‐7612.	  
 
Why rapidly expanding the number of college-trained
workers may not lower income inequality: The curious
case of Taiwan, 1978-2011
 Shao-Hsun Keng,   Chun-Hung Lin,  Peter Orazem
Working Paper No. 14026
December 2014
1 
 
Why rapidly expanding the number of college-trained workers may not lower 
income inequality: The curious case of Taiwan, 1978-2011 
 
Shao-Hsun Keng, National University of Kaohsiung, Taiwan 
Chun-Hung Lin, Tamkang University, Taiwan 
Peter F. Orazem, Iowa State University, USA 
 
December 2014 
 
 
 
Since 1990, Taiwan increased the college share of its labor force from 7% to 28% by 
converting junior colleges to 4-year colleges.  Such a rapid surge in skill supply 
should suppress college wages and lower income inequality.  Instead, inequality rose 
steadily.  The surge of weaker college graduates made them weak substitutes for 
better trained college graduates, increasing wage inequality within skill groups. The 
college premium would have been 15% higher had college quality remained 
unchanged at its 1992 level.  The Taiwan case shows that increasing college access 
alone will not lower income inequality unless college quality is maintained. 
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I. Introduction 
 Taiwan's labor market has absorbed a remarkable expansion in the supply of 
college educated workers over the past two decades.  The annual number of college 
graduates increased five-fold in 20 years: from 56 thousand in 1990 to nearly 300 
thousand in 2011.  As shown in Figure 1, the surge in college graduates is nearly 
fully explainable by changes in government policy.  Starting in 1990, junior colleges 
were converted into 4-year colleges and the required pass rate on the college entrance 
exam was relaxed.  These policies greatly increased access to college, generating a 
substantial shift in the supply of college-educated labor.  As a result, the ratio of high 
school graduates going to colleges in each year rose from 15% to 89%.1   
Such a rapid change in the college share of the labor market overall and of the 
cohort of new market entrants in particular would be expected to have large effects on 
returns to schooling and income inequality in Taiwan.  The impact on the 
distribution of skills in the labor force is shown in Figure 2.  Between 1990 and 2011, 
the share of labor force comprised of 4 year college graduates rose from 7% to 28%.  
The largest effects should be on the earnings of new market entrants, as the ratio of 
new college graduates to the number of 22-24 year olds rose from 12% to 73%.2 
                                                       
1 The dropout rate in colleges is less than 2% (MOE, 2014).   
2 This is computed as ୡ୭୪୪ୣ୥ୣ	୥୰ୟୢ୳ୟ୲ୣୱ	୧୬	୷ୣୟ୰	୲ሺ୮୭୮୳୪ୟ୲୧୭୬	ୟ୥ୣୢ	ଶଶ‐ଶସ	୧୬	୷ୣୟ୰	୲ሻ/ଷ 
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 In contrast to the Taiwan case, a key factor explaining rising wage inequality in 
many OECD economies has been the slow growth of the supply of college graduates 
relative to rising trend growth in technology that drives demand for college-educated 
labor (OECD, 2011).  While the college share of the Taiwan labor force was rising at 
7.3% per year over the past 15 years, the OECD average growth rate was 3.7%.3  
The average growth rate of the college share in the G-7 was even smaller at 2.8%, and 
smaller still is the 1.3% growth rate in the U.S.  As shown initially by Katz and 
Murphy (1992) and updated by Goldin and Katz (2008), growth in the relative supply 
of college graduates in the labor market will tend to lower the returns to college and 
reduce wage inequality provided the growth in college supply outpaces the growth in 
relative demand for college graduates.  Indeed, college wages fell relative to wages 
for less educated workers from 1915 to 1960 because the supply of skills outpaced 
technological expansion.  Since 1980, however, relative demand for college 
graduates has grown faster than relative supply in many of the OECD countries, even 
though the pace of skill-based technical change slowed since the mid-1990s.4 
                                                       
3 Computed using data from OECD (2012). 
4 A related literature has examined whether there is a common tendency across countries for income 
inequality to rise or fall as human capital attainment increases.  Knight and Sabot (1983) showed that 
the answer depended on whether the human capital investments are broadly distributed in the 
population and whether supply of or demand for skills grows faster.  De Gregorio and Lee (2002) and 
Sylwester (2002) found that rising educational attainment or public educational expenditures lowered 
inequality but Rodríguez‐Pose and Tselios (2009) found that increasing tertiary schooling increased 
inequality in European countries. 
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The slowing of the growth of skill supply has been most pronounced among the 
youngest labor cohorts.  Card and Lemieux (2001) showed that a relative skill 
shortage among the youngest cohorts of labor market entrants drove rising returns to 
young college graduates in the 1990s in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., even as rates 
of return stabilized for older college graduates. 
If slow growth of the supply of college graduates relative to the pace of 
technological change favoring skill is at least partially responsible for rising 
inequality among the OECD economies, the Taiwan case should represent a useful 
counterexample.  With the Taiwan college graduate share of the workforce rising at 
twice the OECD rate, and the Taiwan college share among young labor market 
entrants rising even more rapidly, the growth of relative college supply in Taiwan 
outpaces any estimate of the technology growth rate.  More importantly, the college 
enrollment surges coincide with a presumed reduction in the quality of college 
graduates which would further depress the Taiwan college premium.  Carneiro and 
Lee (2011) use college enrollment rates across regions of birth in the U.S. to identify 
the effect of college quality on the wage premium.  They find that increases in 
college enrollment between 1960 and 2000 lowered the average quality of college 
graduates, leading to a 6 percentage point decline in college premium. 
Chen (2013) used data from the Taiwan Manpower Survey to examine the 
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expansion of post-secondary education on the college premium in Taiwan.  Applying 
Card and Lemieux’s (2001) framework, she found that despite the substantial 
increases in the supply of college graduates, the college premium did not fall.  
Moreover, her measure of changes in the quality of college graduates, the share of 
vocational relative to academic high school graduates, did not affect the college wage 
premium.  She concluded that the increase in the relative supply of college graduates 
was completely absorbed by the rising relative demand for college graduates across 
all age groups.  Her results leave a remaining puzzle: the college premium for older 
college graduates rose, even as college returns remained steady overall. 
Our paper differs from Chen’s (2013) in several ways.  First, we use data from 
the Taiwan Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (SFIE), 1978-2011 rather than 
the Taiwan Manpower Survey.  Unlike the Manpower Survey, the SFIE includes 
commissions, bonuses, stock options, profit and gain sharing, and other forms of 
performance pay.  Performance pay is an increasingly important component of a 
worker’s total compensation (Lazear, 2000; Lemieux et al., 2009; Heywood and 
Parent, 2009; Pannenberg and Spiess, 2009; Bell and Van Reenen, 2013) in many 
countries including Taiwan, and is particularly important for college graduates.  As 
we show below, the stable or declining trend in income inequality found by Chen 
using the Manpower data is completely reversed once performance pay is included 
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with wage income.5  This is consistent with the experience in the U.S. that the 
income inequality among male workers from the 1970 to the early 1990s would have 
been 21% less if performance pay was not included (Lemieux et al., 2009).  
A second difference is that we follow Carneiro and Lee (2011) in measuring 
quality differences between young and old college workers.  Chen’s quality measure 
averages across young and old college graduates which implicitly presume that older 
and younger college graduates have equal skills.  
A third difference is that we use methods employed by Autor, Katz and Kearney 
(2008) and Lemieux (2009) to construct quality-constant and composition-constant 
counterfactual paths for wages per unit of human capital and labor market 
composition.  These allow us to illustrate how returns to post-secondary education 
evolved for older and younger cohorts of college graduates.  
This study reaches markedly different conclusions from Chen’s regarding the 
effects of the unprecedented increase in the supply of college graduates in Taiwan on 
college premium.  Our key findings include: (1) there are sharp increases in the 
returns to college education but these gains are disproportionately earned by older 
cohorts of college graduates; (2) driving these findings is the fact that the newer 
college graduates are of lower average quality than older college cohorts and as a 
                                                       
5  Studies of income inequality using the Manpower Survey which excludes the bonus from 
compensation include Chan, et al. (1999), Chen and Hsu (2001), Cheng (2004), and Chen (2013). 
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result, young college graduates and graduates who previously were excluded from 
college are weak substitutes for older college graduates; (3) the return to college 
would have been 8-15% higher if the quality of young college graduates had remained 
at their 1992 levels; (4) both wage per unit of human capital and education 
composition of the labor force contribute to the decline in the relative college 
premium earned by of young workers after the expanded access to college; and (5) the 
expansion of college enrollment widens wage inequality both between old and young 
college graduates, but also within the group of young college graduates due to the 
increasing variance in college quality.   
 The next two sections present the stylized facts of schooling outcomes and wage 
inequality in Taiwan from 1978 to 2006.  Section IV shows that a model with 
imperfect substitution between older and younger college graduates and between high 
and low quality college graduates can explain the diverging paths of college wage 
premia for young and old workers.  Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Background 
Taiwan has experienced two waves of expansion in higher education over the 
past two decades.  The first wave started around 1991 as two-year colleges were 
allowed to change to four-year colleges called Institutes of Science and Technology.  
As shown in Figure 1, 68 4-year Institutes of Science and Technology had opened by 
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2000.  A second wave of expanded college access began around 1997 when the 
newly formed 4-year colleges were allowed to convert to Universities of Science and 
Technology if they had at least three colleges.  Over the same period, the minimum 
acceptable score on the college entrance exam was lowered considerably, and the 
fraction qualifying for college rose from 35% to 58%.  As a result, college 
enrollments more than doubled.  By 2003, there were as many college graduates as 
there were high school graduates four years earlier.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the 
surge in college enrollments rapidly increased the share of college graduates in the 
labor force from 7.2% to 28%.  The impact on younger cohorts was even more 
pronounced, as 73% of the population aged 22-24 had a 4-year college degree.  
 Such a rapid expansion of the supply of college graduates would normally be 
expected to lower returns to college, reducing wage inequality.  A similar rapid 
expansion of college graduation rates occurred in Korea in the 1970s.  Between 1972 
and 1989, the college share of the labor force rose from 14% to 25%.  Kim and Topel 
(1995) and Fields and Yoo (2001) found that wage inequality fell rapidly as the 
college share of the labor market increased.  But returns to college actually rose in 
Taiwan despite the supply surge (Lin and Orazem 2003, 2004).  However, workers 
with less than 10 years in the labor force did experience declining returns to college.6  
                                                       
6  Chen and Hsu (2001) argued that the college expansion in Taiwan led to declining wage inequality.  
However, their analysis focused only on young males with 10 years or less of work experience.  Their 
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If the slow expansion of the college educated work force is viewed as a main 
factor in rising college return in the United States, Canada, and the UK (Card and 
Lemieux,2001; Goldin and Katz, 2008), then the failure of the rapid increase in 
college supply to depress college premium significantly in Taiwan is a puzzle.  A 
plausible explanation which we explore in this paper is that the expansion of college 
access generated college graduates who were not of the same quality as graduates of 
the traditional 4-year universities.  If Taiwan employers discount the skills earned at 
the converted 2-year colleges relative to those of graduates at traditional programs, 
wage inequality will rise among the new cohorts of college graduates.  At the same 
time, if young and old college graduates are not perfect substitutes, the return to 
college for older workers will be only partially affected by the surge in college supply.   
III. Trends in Three Measures of Wage Inequality in Taiwan 
 We start by summarizing the stylized facts of the wage structure over the past 
three decades in Taiwan.  We use annual wage income that includes performance pay 
from the SFIE 1978-2006.  The time series ends at 2006, the last year individual data 
from the SFIE was made publicly available.  For what follows in this section, we 
define college educated workers as those with a college degree or above while our 
high school educated group includes those with a high school degree.  Figure 3 
                                                                                                                                                           
study also ignored bonuses which are most important in high skill jobs and excluded omen who 
represented rapidly growing share of the labor force. 
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shows the overall and age specific time paths of the college plus wage premium over 
the past 30 years.  The average premium over a high school degree doubled between 
1978 and 1992 and then remained fairly stable thereafter.  The age-specific time 
paths show that the overall pattern masks diverging wage experiences for the younger 
and older college graduates.  While younger college workers enjoyed a higher wage 
premium than older workers throughout the 1980s, as college access increased after 
1993, the returns to younger college workers fell from 43% in 1993 to 37%.  In 
contrast, the college plus premium continued to grow for older college graduates, 
rising from 49% to 70% during the same time period.  The negative impact of the 
rising relative supply of college-educated workers on wage premium is confined to 
younger workers only, while relative demand for older college-trained workers rose 
throughout.  As shown in Figure 4, the difference in the college plus wage premium 
between younger (26-35) and older (46-55) workers gets progressively more negative 
after the early 1990s. The implication is that the wage gap between young and old 
college-educated workers is growing faster than the wage gap between young and old 
high-school educated workers.7   
Additional insights can be garnered by exploring the return to college across 
different age cohorts during the period of rapidly expanding college access.  Figure 
                                                       
7  ln ቀ௪రలఱఱ೎௪రలఱఱಹ ቁ െ ln ቀ
௪మలయఱ೎
௪మలయఱಹ
ቁ ൌ ln ቀ௪రలఱఱ೎௪మలయఱ೎ ቁ െ ln ቀ
௪రలఱఱಹ
௪మలయఱಹ
ቁ 
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5A plots the college plus/high school wage gap for five age groups.  The youngest 
workers (solid line, aged 26-30) experienced a rising college plus wage premium until 
1993 after which the premium fell.  For older cohorts, the college wage premium 
rose over time with the highest premium in 2003-2006.  Moreover, the fastest 
growing college plus premia were for the ages more distant from the youngest cohorts.  
The pattern is consistent with both presumptions that the young and old 
college-educated workers are imperfect substitutes and that the young were receiving 
poorer college training compared to older college graduates. 
 The role of cohort-specific supply shocks is further illustrated in Figure 5B.  
Before the 1990s, the ratio of college plus-to-high school educated workers grew 
similarly for older and younger cohorts.  After the change in college access began, 
the ratio of college plus to high school educated workers grew much more rapidly for 
the youngest cohorts.  If college-educated workers with different levels of 
experience are imperfect substitutes, then the sharp increase in college shares for 
younger workers will depress wages most for the young college graduates but would 
have less impact, if any, on the wages of older cohorts of college graduates.  In fact, 
the simple correlation between relative supply of and relative wages for college 
graduates is weekly negative for the youngest cohorts but is strongly positive for the 
oldest college cohorts.  The latter result is consistent with pervasive shifts of relative 
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demand toward college graduates that are outstripping supply growth, similar to the 
pattern observed in many of the OECD economies.  However, the growth of college 
supply appears to be outpacing skill-biased technological change for the youngest 
cohorts.  
IV. The Effect of Age-Specific Supplies and School Quality on College/High 
School Wage Inequality 
 We adapt the methods used by Card and Lemieux (2001) and Autor, Katz and 
Kearney (2008) to the Taiwanese labor market.  We divide the labor force at any 
time t into two groups, high school educated workers Ht and college educated workers 
Ct.8  Each of these education groups is composed of J age cohorts within each 
education group according to: 
 ܥ௧ ൌ ൣ∑ ሺܽ௝ܥ௝௧ఎ௃௝ ሻ൧
ଵ/ఎ
           (1) 
 ܪ௧ ൌ ൣ∑ ሺܾ௝ܪ௝௧ఎ௃௝ ሻ൧
ଵ/ఎ
           (2) 
The elasticity of substitution between different age groups ( A ) is positively related 
to η, ∞ ൏ ߟ ൑ 1, by the relation ߟ ൌ 1 െ ଵఙಲ.  ܥ௧ and ܪ௧ are measured in 
efficiency units.  The parameters ja  and jb  are constant technology parameters 
that allow productivity to vary across age cohort j for high school and college laborers, 
respectively. 
                                                       
8  Results are unchanged if we use three groups, high school or less, junior college and Bachelor’s 
degree or more 
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 The rapid growth of the supply of college graduates in Taiwan involved relaxing 
the passing standards on the college entrance exam and converting junior colleges to 
four-year colleges, changes that should lower the quality of a portion of the new 
cohorts of college graduates compared to older cohorts.  This suggests that there will 
be imperfect substitutability between ܥ்௝௧, “Traditional” college graduates who 
would have met the previous entrance requirements and received training of 
traditional quality; and ܥே௝௧, “Nontraditional” graduates who would not have met the 
previous entrance standards nor received the traditional level of training.  As a result, 
we further modify the efficiency units of a college cohort by:  
 ܥ௝௧ ൌ ൫ܥ்௝௧௩ ൅ ܥே௝௧௩ ൯
భ
ೡ           (3) 
ݒ ൌ 1 െ 1 ߪ௖௢௟௟௘௚௘⁄  
The parameter ݒ sets the magnitude of ߪ௖௢௟௟௘௚௘, the elasticity of substitution 
between the traditional and nontraditional graduates in a college age cohort. 
 We do not observe separate wage series for traditional and nontraditional college 
graduates.  We assume that the observed natural log of the college wage for a given 
cohort, log൫ݓ௝௧஼൯ will be related to the wage for the traditional college graduates 
according to: 
log൫ݓ௝௧஼൯ ൌ log൫ݓ௝௧்஼൯ ൅ 	ݎ݈݋݃ߠ௝௧          (4) 
where ݓ௝௧்஼ is the unobserved wage of traditional college graduates, and ߠ௝௧ ∈ ሺ0,1ሿ 
14 
 
is the share of college workers for age group j that meet the traditional college 
standards.  Because	݈݋݃ߠ௝௧ ൏ 0, we would expect r > 0 so that the average college 
wage is smaller than the wage paid to the traditional college graduates.  As the 
traditional share of a college cohort j falls, the gap between the average college wage 
and that paid the traditional fraction in the cohort rises, meaning that within cohort 
inequality will decrease in ߠ௝௧.		In the limit when ߠ௝௧ ൌ 1 as is the case with the 
oldest college graduates, the observed average college wage is equal to the wage paid 
the traditional college graduates in the cohort and there will be no within group 
inequality.  On the other hand, within group inequality will be increasing for the 
youngest cohorts of college graduates as the college entrance requirements are relaxed 
and as more two-year colleges are converted to Bachelor’s degree granting 
institutions. 
 The aggregate production function is given by the CES form: 
ݕ௧ ൌ ൣߙ௧ܥ௧ఘ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܪ௧ఘ൧
భ
ഐ          (5) 
where  െ∞ ൏ ߩ ൑ 1	sets the elasticity of substitution ߪ௘ௗ௨ between the two 
education groups; ቀߩ ൌ 1 െ ଵఙ೐೏ೠቁ; and ߙ௧ is time varying technology or 
demographic changes that alter the skill share of production.  Using the chain rule, 
the marginal products of workers from traditional universities and high school in age 
group j at time t are given as follows: 
15 
 
 డ௤೟డ஼೅ೕ೟ ൌ
డ௤೟
డ஼೟
డ஼೟
డ஼ೕ೟
డ஼ೕ೟
డ஼೅ೕ೟ ൌ ൫ ௝ܽߙ௧ݍ௧
ଵିఘܥ௝௧ఎିଵܥ௧ఘିఎ൯ ൈ ߠ௝௧௩ିଵ     (6) 
 డ௤೟డுೕ೟ ൌ
డ௤೟
డு೟
డு೟
డுೕ೟ ൌ ൣ ௝ܾሺ1 െ ߙ௧ሻݍ௧
ଵିఘܪ௝௧ఎିଵܪ௧ఘିఎ൧      (7) 
where ܥ்௝௧ ൌ ߠ௝௧ܥ௝௧.  The first-order condition requires that all education cohorts 
are paid their marginal products.  Because we observe ݓ௝௧஼  rather than ݓ௝௧்஼, 
equation (4) suggests that we add ݎ݈݋݃ߠ௝௧ to both sides of the first-order condition 
for traditional college graduates.  Imposing these conditions, the relative wage of 
college to high school graduates in cohort j in year t becomes: 
ln ቆݓ௝௧
஼
ݓ௝௧ுቇ ൌ ln ൬
ߙ௧
1 െ ߙ௧൰ ൅ ln ቆ
௝ܽ
௝ܾ
ቇ െ 1ߪ௘ௗ௨ ln ൬
ܥ௧
ܪ௧൰ െ
1
ߪ஺ ቈln ቆ
ܥ௝௧
ܪ௝௧ቇ െ ln ൬
ܥ௧
ܪ௧൰቉ 
																										െሺߥ െ 1 ൅ ݎሻln	ሺߠ௝௧ሻ          (8) 
Equation (8) can be estimated directly under the assumption that the college and high 
school educated cohorts represent exogenous supply shifts to the Taiwanese labor 
market.  The first term on the right hand side of Equation (8) captures shifts in 
relative demand toward or away from skilled labor.  Following Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney (2008), these shifts can be captured by a time trend, the male unemployment 
rate (a business cycle indicator) and the minimum wage. The ݈݊ ൬௔ೕ௕ೕ൰	term represents 
the relative productivity of the two education groups in cohort j whose effects are 
controlled through age group dummies.  The next two terms allow us to estimate the 
elasticities of substitution between education groups and between age groups.  The 
last term provides an upper-bound estimate of the substitutability between traditional 
16 
 
and nontraditional college graduates because, with r>0,  ଵଵିజି௥ ൐
ଵ
ଵିజ ൌ ߪ௖௢௟௟௘௚௘. 
We use an inverse approximation of ߠ௝௧: log	ሺ ௝ܲሻ the log pass rate on the college 
entrance exam four years before the cohort graduation date.  As the pass rate rises, 
the average quality of the college cohort should fall, whether because a greater 
proportion received training at inferior colleges or because entrants to traditional 
colleges were of lower average quality.9  There are two important reasons to use the 
pass rate on the entrance exam rather than the fraction of the college cohort 
graduating from the traditional colleges. First, the pass rate is the exogenous policy 
variable that affects college choice while the fraction going to traditional or 
nontraditional colleges reflects the endogenous response to the changing access to 
college.  Second, the pass rate will alter the distribution of skills of the college 
graduates regardless of which college they went to.  Not only will weak students go 
to the converted junior colleges, the rosters of the traditional colleges will also be 
drawn from a pool that includes many previously unqualied exam scores.  Therefore, 
the rising pass rate is a better indicator of the likely declining skill levels of 
progressive cohorts of college graduates than is the fraction of the cohort graduating 
from a traditional colleges. 
                                                       
9 We also used the fraction of Bachelor’s degrees from newly converted colleges, getting estimates that 
were similar in sign and significance.  The Bachelor’s degree data includes older graduates and so it is 
harder to tie them to a given age cohort.  
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IV. Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports the estimates of Equation (8).  We obtain similar results, 
whether we use the method suggested by Card and Lemieux (2001) or that used by 
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008).  The coefficient on log ൬஼ೕ೟ுೕ೟൰ implies that a one 
percent increase in the relative college to high school supply for age group j leads to a 
0.07 percent decrease in the college-high school wage gap.  The implied elasticity of 
substitution between age groups is 14, which is greater than corresponding estimates 
of 4 to 6 reported for the U.S. (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 
2008).  We get a similar effect of the aggregate college to high school employment 
ratio log ൬஼ೕ೟ுೕ೟൰	on the college-high school pay gap.  A one percent increase in the 
ratio of college to high school workers depresses the relative wage by 0.07 percent, 
implying an elasticity of substitution between education groups of 14 which is also 
3-4 times larger than that found in the U.S.  Two factors potentially are responsible 
for getting large elasticities of substitution as opposed to those in other papers.  First, 
we do not observe hours worked in SFIE.  Labor supply is thus constructed using the 
number of workers, rather than the number of hours worked.  The relative supply of 
college to high school equivalents are likely to be highly correlated across years 
unless the composition of educational attainment in the labor force changes 
significantly.  Second, we correct for the quality of college graduates over time 
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making college and high school groups more homogeneous, which tends to increase 
the elasticity of substitution within groups.It is apparent that school quality also plays 
a role in the college premium.  A one percent increase in the pass rate on the 
entrance exam reduces the college-high school pay gap by 0.13 percent.  The 
implied upper-bound of the elasticity of substitution between traditional and 
nontraditional college graduates is ଵଵିజି௥ ൌ ቀ
ଵ
଴.ଵଷቁ ൌ7.7.  We can correct for the bias 
by deriving an estimate of r in equation (4).  We regressed the cohort-specific log 
college wage log൫ݓ௝௧஼൯ on the logarithm of the cohort’s college entrance exam pass 
rate ݈݋݃ ௝ܲ, time and age group dummies.  The coefficient on ݈݋݃ ௝ܲ is -0.36, 
implying that r = 0.36.  The implied elasticity of substitution between college 
workers with different quality is ଵଵିజ ൌ ቀ
ଵ
଴.ଵଷା଴.ଷ଺ቁ ൌ2.04.  The literal implication is 
that the nontraditional college graduates are relatively weak substitutes for similarly 
aged graduates from traditional programs.   
For robustness, we re-estimated equation (8) excluding junior college graduates 
who had been included with the high school group.  One might be concerned that 
including the junior college graduates with the high school graduates would 
artificially increase the measured substitutability between college and high school 
workers.  However, the coefficient estimates barely change when the two-year 
college workers are excluded. 
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Skilled-Biased Technical Change is often cited as the main cause for the shift in 
relative demand favoring skilled labor and the subsequent rising college plus premium 
in Europe and North America.  In Taiwan, we would expect a similar process to be 
driving relative labor demand toward college-educated workers.  Indeed we see that 
process clearly for the oldest college cohorts in Figures 5A and 5B.  The older 
college graduates experienced progressively higher relative pay compared to their 
high school educated counterparts.  However, at the same time we see declining 
wage premia for the youngest college educated workers.  More recent college 
graduates are not experiencing the same productivity boost from complementary 
capital investments, consistent with our hypothesis that the rapid expansion of college 
enrollment lowered the average quality of young college graduates.   
While the nontraditional college graduates are not getting a premium for their 
schooling, the wages of the traditionally-educated college graduates in their age 
cohort are only moderately depressed by the large cohort of weak college graduates.  
Weak substitutability between traditional and nontraditional college graduates means 
that the surge in college graduates should create a pay gap between weak and strong 
college graduates in the same graduating class.   
Quality-Adjusted College Premium 
 In this subsection, we examine the extent to which falling quality of college 
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educated workers accounts for the stagnation of college plus premium after early 
1990s.  We construct a quality-adjusted time series of the college plus premium by 
fixing the quality of college-educated worker alternatively at the 1978 and 1992 levels.  
Since the pass rate of the college entrance exam is used as a proxy for quality, we use 
the estimates from Equation (8) to predict the quality-adjusted wage gap for each age 
group.  We are particularly interested in younger workers because they are affected 
the most by the expansion of higher education. 
Figure 6 demonstrates how college wage premia were altered by college quality 
changes since 1978 and Figure 7 shows how college quality changes since 1992 
affected the college wage premia.  For workers aged 46-55, the unadjusted college 
plus premia grew until 1987 and then stagnated for 10 years before resuming its 
growth.  The period of stagnating premia for 46-55 year-olds corresponds to a 10 
year increase in the college entry pass rate for that cohort 20 years earlier. In contrast, 
when college quality is held at its 1978 and 1992 levels, the adjusted college plus 
wage premium rises steadily through the entire period, reflecting steadily increasing 
demand for skill.  In addition, other than the 10-year anomaly attributable to the 
temporary relaxing of college entry standards in the 1960s, the gaps between the 
adjusted and unadjusted series are very small.  This suggests that the expanded 
access to higher education did not significantly depress the college premium for older 
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college educated workers.   
The pattern of college wage premia for the younger workers aged 26-35 is very 
different.  The unadjusted series of college wage premia rose steadily until the first 
graduates under the expanded college supply began to enter the market.  When 
college cohort quality is held at the 1978 level or at its 1992 level, the college wage 
premia continues to rise until 2002 and levels off thereafter.  The diverging pattern of 
wage premia between the quality adjusted and the quality varying series after the mid 
1990s is consistent with progressively declining quality of college educated workers 
in the younger group.  The wage premium would have been 8% higher had college 
quality stayed at its 1978 level and 15% higher had college quality remained at its 
1992 level.  The expanded college access appears to affect the wages of younger 
graduates only, consistent with the earlier findings that young and older college 
educated workers are not perfect substitutes.  As a result, the expansion of college 
enrollment increases wage inequality between older and younger college-educated 
workers. 
Decomposition of the Wage and Composition Effect 
The significant post-1990 decline in the college plus premium of younger workers 
relative to older ones coincides with the expansion of college education.  Hence, it is 
important from policy point of view to examine the extent to which changes in labor 
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force composition and relative wages contribute to the decline in the college plus 
premium among young workers.  We use log ቀ௪೟మలయఱ೎௪೟మలయఱ೓ ቁ െ log ቀ
௪೟రలఱఱ೎
௪೟రలఱఱ೓ ቁ ൌ log ቀ
௪೟మలయఱ೎
௪೟రలఱఱ೎ ቁ െ
log ൬௪೟మలయఱ೓௪೟రలఱఱ೓ ൰ to measure the relative college plus premium of younger workers to the 
older ones.  The second term shows the difference in the relative wages of the young 
vs. old between workers with a college plus and high school degree.  To estimate the 
contribution of the increase in college enrollment to the decline in the relative college 
premium of young workers, we construct a counterfactual distribution of wages in the 
absence of college expansion using the reweighting approach devised by DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and used by DiNardo and Lemieux (1997), Lemieux 
(2006), and Autor et. al. (2008).  Our counterfactuals fix relative wages at their 1978, 
1992 and 2006 levels and allow the composition of the labor force to evolve at 
historical rates.  The reweighting function is calculated by a logit model that includes 
dummies for educational attainment, potential experience, a quadratic in potential 
experience, the interaction of potential experience with educational attainment, and the 
interaction of the pass rate on the college entrance exam with a college dummy 
variable.  Our counterfactuals take into account changes in quality of 
college-educated workers.  The series are shown in Figure 8.  The vertical difference 
between the counterfactual and actual wage series represents the effect of changes in 
wages on the relative college premium of young workers, holding labor force 
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composition constant.  The changes in values from start to end of the counterfactual 
series show the effect of changes in labor force composition while holding the wages 
constant. 
The actual series shows that the college premium of young workers was slightly 
higher than that of older workers until 1992.  A wage premium gap favoring older 
college workers has grown wider ever since.  By 2006, the college premium for older 
workers was 0.34 log points higher than the premium for younger workers.   
The counterfactual series show that had relative wages remained at the 1978 level, 
demographic shifts would have favored young college graduates.  Had they stayed at 
the 1992 level, the young would have only experienced moderately lower premia  But 
demographic shifts that greatly expanded the labor market share of young college 
graduates cause substantial reductions in the college plus premium for younger workers 
when relative wages were fixed at their 2006 levels.  The timing of the decline 
coincides with the large influx of college graduates into the labor market. 
Table 2 summarizes the changes in the observed and composition-constant relative 
college premium of young workers.  The relative college premium of younger 
workers declined by 1.5 log points from 1978 to 1992 and by an additional 33.6 log 
points from 1992 to 2006.  Regardless of the year in which we fix the demographic 
composition, there are large reductions in the college wage premium for the young in 
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the post 1992 period.  The adverse wage effect on the young is largest when the labor 
force composition is fixed at 2006.   Looking down the columns, we find substantial 
reductions in college premia due to changes in the share of young college graduates in 
the labor force.  Looking across the columns while holding composition of the labor 
force constant, we also find substantial reductions in the college premia due to 
declining returns to young college graduates.  In sum, both changes in relative wages 
and changes in labor force composition have contributed to the rising gap in the college 
premium between young and old workers.    
V. Conclusions 
 This paper is motivated by the rapid increase of college-educated workers 
resulted from the expansion of higher education beginning in early 1990s.  The 
college plus/ high school wage gaps of young and older workers have moved in the 
polarizing directions over the past two decades.  In particular, the college premiums 
for younger workers have fallen substantially while the premiums for older workers 
have risen significantly. 
 Our model allows for imperfect substitutability between traditional and newly 
converted college workers.  We argue that the divergent trends of the college 
plus/high school wage gaps between young and older workers can be largely 
explained by the age-specific relative supplies, falling productivity of young college 
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graduates, and the continued rise in the demand for skilled labor.  As a result, the 
firms substitute more experienced college-trained workers for their less experienced 
counterparts, leading to falling college premia for younger college graduates even as 
college premia are rising for older graduates.  Our results consistently show that 
falling quality of college education due to the relaxation of college access plays an 
important role in falling returns to young college graduates.  The college plus 
premium would have been 8-15% higher had the quality of young college remained at 
their 1992 levels.   
 Our findings differ from Chen’s (2013) conclusion that changes in the quality of 
college graduates did not affect the college wage premium.  The increase in the 
relative supply of college graduates is completely absorbed by the rising relative 
demand for college graduates across all age groups.  The factor driving this 
discrepancy is that Chen’s quality measure averages across young and old college 
graduates.  This implicitly presumes that older and younger college graduates have 
equal skills, an assumption that proves inconsistent with the data. 
The rising relative supply of young college-educated workers as well as their 
lower average quality have both contributed to the decline in the college wage 
premium for younger workers.  At the same time, skill-biased technical change has 
increased the college premia earned by older college graduates who were only 
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educated in the better traditional universities.  In addition, younger and older college 
graduates are imperfect substitutes and so the adverse impacts of rising 
college-educated labor supply were disproportionately absorbed by the youngest 
college cohorts.  As a result, the rapid increases in college supply in Taiwan 
increased wage inequality between young and old college graduates and among young 
college graduates educated in traditional and newly formed four-year universities.  
As the Taiwan case shows, increasing access to college without maintaining quality 
can raise rather than lower income inequality in the economy. 
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Figure 1: University qualification pass rates, converted junior colleges, and share of high school graduates attending universities in Taiwan, 
1978‐2011 
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Figure 2: Share of bachelor’s degree recipients in the labor force and relative to the youngest cohort in Taiwan, 1978‐2011 
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Figure 3: The overall college+ premium and college+ premium by age groups, 
1978‐2006   
 
 
Figure 4: Difference in the college+ premium between young (26‐35) and old workers 
(46‐55), 1978‐2006 
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Figure 5A: Trends of college premium by age group, 1978-2006 
 
 
Figure 5B: Relative labor supply of college to high school educated workers by age 
group, 1978-200
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Figure 6: Unadjusted and quality-adjusted college wage premia for young (26-35) and 
old (46-55) workers.  Quality is fixed at its 1978 level. 
 
   
Figure 7: Unadjusted and quality-adjusted college wage premia for young (26-35) and 
old (46-55) workers.  Quality is fixed at its 1992 level.
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Figure 8: Actual and counterfactual difference in the college premium between younger and older workers: prices fixed at 1978, 1992, and 2006 
levels.
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Table 1: Estimates of the Weighted Least Square for College /High School Wage Gap: 1978-2006 
Variable Card and Lemieux Autor, Katz and Kearney 
 First Step Second Step College Cplus/High School  Junior College Excluded 
log൫ܥ௝௧ ܪ௝௧⁄ ൯ -0.072 (0.027)*** — — — — 
log	ሺ ௝ܲ௧ିସሻ.		  -0.133 (0.031)*** -0.132 (0.032)*** -0.134 (0.032)*** -0.127 (0.032)*** -0.11 (0.034)*** 
log൫ܥ௝௧ ܪ௝௧⁄ ൯ െ 	logሺܥ௧ ܪ௧⁄ ሻ  — -0.071 (0.032)*** -0.07 (0.031)*** -0.089 (0.031)*** -0.071 (0.025)*** 
logሺܥ௧ ܪ௧⁄ ሻ — -0.075 (0.06) -0.081 (0.056) -0.039 (0.06) -0.055 (0.038) 
t 0.001 (0.001)*** 0.009 (0.002)*** 0.01 (0.002)*** 0.01 (0.002)*** 0.009 (0.002)*** 
Age31-35 0.016 (0.035)***  0.016 (0.034)*** 0.016 (0.035)***  0.008 (0.036)***  -0.002 (0.035)*** 
Age36-40 0.083 (0.035)***  0.082 (0.034)*** 0.083 (0.034)***  0.085 (0.036)***  0.069 (0.035)*** 
Age41-45 0.108 (0.035)***  0.11 (0.035)*** 0.108 (0.035)***  0.113 (0.036)***  0.097 (0.035)*** 
Age46-50 0.105 (0.036)***  0.105 (0.036)*** 0.105 (0.036)***  0.107 (0.037)***  0.094 (0.037)*** 
Age51-55 0.085 (0.038)***  0.086 (0.038)*** 0.086 (0.038)***  0.086 (0.039)***  0.075 (0.038)*** 
Age56-60 0.044 (0.04)  0.045 (0.041) 0.044 (0.040)  0.038 (0.04)  0.034 (0.04) 
Age61-65 0.005 (0.041)  0.005 (0.041) 0.006 (0.041)  0.0004 (0.042)  -0.001 (0.041) 
Unemployment rate 0.011 (0.004)*** 0.011 (0.005)*** 0.011 (0.005)*** 0.012 (0.005)*** 0.011 (0.005)*** 
Minimum wage -0.003 (0.014) -0.002 (0.015) -0.003 (0.015) -0.007 (0.014) -0.003 (0.014) 
F statistics 49.51 45.49 45.50 63.33 46.4 
R2 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.78 0.72 
N 232 232 232 232 232 
Note: *** significant at 1% significance level.  ** significant at 5% significance level.  * significant at 10% significance level.
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Table 2: Actual and Composition-Constant Changes in the Relative College 
Premium of Younger Workers 
 1978-1992 1992-2006 1978-2006 
Actual -1.5 -33.6 -35.1 
Worker attributes fixed at 
their 1978 levels 
-1.1 -13.6 -14.7 
Worker attributes fixed at 
their 1992 levels 
-0.5 -17.3 -17.8 
Worker attributes fixed at 
their 2006 levels 
-10.4 -26.7 -37.1 
Note: Log points have been multiplied by 100. 
 
